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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S VERDICT? 
When an appeal is taken from a bench trial the proper standard 
of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard. Under this standard, 
the appellate court reviews the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. If the appeals court finds some evidence or inferences 
upon which findings of all of the requisite elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, then the trial court's verdict is affirmed. 
State v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576 (Utah App. 1994). 
ISSUE II. DID THE TRIAL COURT MAKE AN INCORRECT FINDING 
OF FACT AND THEREBY CREATE A REVERSIBLE ERROR? 
The factual findings of a trial court will not be set aside 
unless they are found by the reviewing court to be clearly 
erroneous. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
West Valley City Municipal Code, §21-6-107. FLEEING A PEACE 
OFFICER. 
It is a class "B" misdemeanor for any person on foot or on or 
in a non-motorized vehicle to knowingly flee from, evade, escape or 
attempt to flee from, escape or evade a peace officer after being 
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lawfully detained, arrested or stopped, or after receiving a 
reasonable visual or audible signal or command to remain or stop. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the prosecution and conviction of Roy 
Benjamin Hoskins ("Hoskins") for a violation of §21-6-107, West 
Valley City Municipal Code, "Fleeing a Peace Officer." 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution in this case was commenced with the arrest of 
Hoskins on March 22, 2001. (Record p.l) . An amended information was 
filed with the trial court on July 9, 2001. (Record p. 15). 
Following discovery and a pre-trial conference, the Honorable Pat 
Brian conducted a bench trial on July 9, 2001, in the Third 
District Court-West Valley Department. Following trial, Hoskins 
filed a Notice of Appeal on July 16, 2001. (Record p.18). 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
Hoskins was convicted of the Class B Misdemeanor "Fleeing a 
Peace Officer," §21-6-107, West Valley City Municipal Code. He was 
sentenced by the trial court immediately following his bench trial. 
The sentence imposed by the court consisted of a fine in the amount 
of $300, a 30-day jail sentence which was suspended, a written 
letter of apology to be provided to the West Valley City Police 
Department, and a 12 month probationary period. (Record p.17). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
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The City accepts the Appellant's statement regarding the 
relevant facts in this case, with the following additions: 
1. Hoskins admitted during cross-examination that he heard 
the officers yelling., (Trial Transcript, p.17). 
2. Hoskins testified that he was aware of the location of 
the patrol car and his distance from the front door of his house 
when the officers began yelling. (Tr. pp.14,15). 
3. Officer Casias testified that more than one police 
officer was yelling for Hoskins to stop. (Tr. p.12). 
4. Officer Casias testified that his yelling of "Stop, 
Police, Stop" was directed at Hoskins alone. (Tr. p.12). 
5. Officer Casias testified that after he yelled "Stop, 
Police, Stop," Hoskins "...saw us and knew we were there and he 
knew—he could hear us, that we were telling him to stop." (Tr. 
p.13) . 
6. Officer Casias testified that despite the yells of the 
officers to stop, Hoskins continued on his way. (Tr. p.13). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. EVIDENCE OF "FLEEING A PEACE OFFICER" WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
GUILTY VERDICT. 
Appellate courts should affirm a trial court verdict if the 
appellate court is able to find some evidence or inferences upon 
which all the elements of the crime can be established. State v. 
Perry, 871 P.2d 576 (Utah App. 1994). In this case, substantial 
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evidence supporting every element of the crime of "Fleeing a Peace 
Officer" was presented to the trial court. Also, Hoskins' conduct 
fits squarely within the plain-meaning definition of the word 
"flee" as that word appears and is used in the ordinance. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A CLEAR ERROR 
IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF HOSKINS' TESTIMONY. 
The testimony presented by Hoskins at trial was confusing and 
often contradictory. The trial court chose to believe Hoskins' 
direct statement that "At the time I believe the police officer was 
telling me or whoever to stop, the police car was at least 75 feet 
away from my house/' (Trial Transcript pp.14-15) . This statement by 
Hoskins, along with the testimony of Officer Casias, support the 
trial court's finding that Hoskins knew the police officers were 
telling him to stop. Since the trial court is m the best position 
to determine the credibility of witnesses, its finding on this 
issue should be given a high degree of deference by the appellate 
court. In this case, the trial court's finding is supported by the 
evidence contained m the record and should be left undisturbed. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I . EVIDENCE OF "FLEEING A PEACE OFFICER" WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
GUILTY VERDICT. 
The City presented sufficient evidence to support the verdict 
of the trial court with regard to Hoskins' conviction for "Fleeing 
a Peace Officer," §21-6-107, West Valley City Municipal Code. 
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There are three essential elements to the crime of "Fleeing a 
Peace Officer." The first is that the subject must be on foot or on 
a non-motorized vehicle. The second element is that the person must 
"knowingly flee from, evade, escape or attempt to flee from, escape 
or evade a peace officer."' The final element is that the subject 
must have received a "reasonable visual or audible signal or 
command to remain or stop." An appellate court should affirm a 
trial court's verdict if it is able to find in the record some 
evidence or inferences upon which all of the elements of the crime 
can be established. State v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576 (Utah App. 1994). 
In this case, ample evidence that Hoskms met all three elements of 
this crime was presented to the trial court. 
It is undisputed that Hoskms meets the first element of the 
crime. All parties agree that Hoskms was on foot, walking from the 
park to his house, at the time that the incident took place. 
There is also no dispute regarding Hoskms' actions with 
respect to the second element of "fleeing from, evading or escaping 
a peace officer." Both the testimony of the police officers and the 
testimony of Hoskms himself indicated that he did not stop and 
talk to the officers prior to entering his house. Despite testimony 
that several officers were yelling at him to stop, Hoskms 
proceeded to enter the house. 
While there is no dispute with regard to the relevant actions 
taken by Hoskms, he now argues that those actions do not 
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constitute "fleeing from, escaping or evading a peace officer." 
This argument is simply without merit. 
Hoskins correctly states that "the statute's unambiguous 
language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." 
Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). He then 
asks this court to violate that concept with respect to the word 
"flee." Hoskins takes pains to explain how his conduct does not 
meet the definition of "escape," "evade," or even "flight," a word 
which does not appear in the statute. Hoskins however, spends very 
little time on the definition of the word "flee," although he does 
admit that it means "running away." (Appellant's Brief p.12). 
Flee is the operative word in this case and exactly fits the 
actions of Hoskins. Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of 
the English Language defines flee as 1. to run away, as from 
danger, pursuers, etc.: take flight. 2. to move swiftly; fly; 
speed. 3. to run away from (a place, person, etc.): They fled the 
town because of the plague. 
If Hoskins' conduct in continuing to walk away after having 
been told to stop by a police officer does not meet the above 
definition of flee, then what does? Flee simply means to run away 
from pursuers, places or persons. That is exactly what Hoskins did. 
He was being pursued by the officers who were telling him to stop 
and he did not stop, but continued to move away from the officers. 
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Hoskms suggests in his brief that hiding or concealment after 
leaving the scene is a necessary part of this crime. That is simply 
not accurate. While that may be a necessary part of "evading" or 
"escaping," it is not part of the common definition of "flee." 
Consistent with the plain meaning of the word flee and the terms of 
the ordinance, leaving the scene itself, after having been told to 
stop, is the act of fleeing. Hoskms would be no less guilty of 
"fleeing" had he been intercepted by the officers prior to reaching 
his house. 
The cases cited by Hoskms in his brief, particularly Utah v. 
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah, 1997); and State v. Fmlayson, 2000 UT 
10, 994 P.2d 1243 (Utah, 2000), are not on point. The Leyva case 
involved multiple violations of the motor vehicle code, statutes 
which have no real relationship to the West Valley City ordinance 
at issue here. Also, the Leyva case contains no explanation as to 
why Mr. Leyva was charged with failing to respond to an officer's 
signal, rather than evading an officer. 
The Fmlayson case is also not applicable. In that case, the 
court defines the word "flight," a word which does not appear in 
the "Fleeing a Peace Officer" ordinance. This definition was set 
forth by the court with respect to a statute which contained an 
enhanced penalty for "flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony." The statute being interpreted in Fmlayson 
is radically different than the ordinance m this case and in fact, 
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contained no requirement that the subject be given a command to 
stop by a police officer. That statute is aimed at a situation and 
conduct totally inconsistent with the "Fleeing a Peace Officer" 
ordinance. 
Hoskms' actions m continuing to move away from the police 
officers after having been told to stop clearly meet the second 
element of "Fleeing a Peace Officer." 
The final element necessary to convict Hoskms is that he 
received a reasonable visual or audible signal or command to stop 
from a peace officer. Again, sufficient evidence was presented to 
the trial court to determine that this element was satisfied. West 
Valley City Police Officer Robert Casias testified that he 
personally told Hoskms to stop at least three or four times and 
that another officer, Officer Pearce, was also yelling at Hoskms 
to stop. (Tr. pp.7, 12.) Casias also testified that these shouts by 
both officers were directed squarely at Hoskms. (Tr. p.12). 
Officer Casias further testified that Hoskms saw him yelling for 
Hoskms to stop and stated "There's no question m our mmd, he--he 
saw us ..." and also "He saw us and knew we were there and he knew— 
he could hear us, that we were telling him to stop." (Tr. pp.11, 
13) . 
Although the version of events as presented by Officer Casias 
was disputed by Hoskms, the Officer's testimony clearly provided 
the trial court with sufficient evidence to satisfy the third 
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element of the crime. When combined with the uncontradicted 
evidence that Mr. Hoskins did not stop when commanded to by the 
officers,, and that he was on foot, it is clear that Hoskins 
committed a violation of §21-6-107, "Fleeing a Peace Officer." 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A CLEAR ERROR 
IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF HOSKINS' TESTIMONY. 
On direct examination, Hoskins testified that "At the time I 
believe the police officer was telling me or whoever to stop, the 
police car was at least 75 feet away from my house." (Tr. pp.14-
15) . He further testified that "At the approximate time, I may have 
been 15 feet from my door--when the officer was telling us to—or 
telling whoever to stop. . . " (Tr. p. 15) . Hoskins now argues that the 
court misinterpreted these statements. 
Upon closer examination of Hoskins' testimony, it is easy to 
see why the trial court decided to accept his statements at face 
value. The trial court was faced with trying to sort out his 
confusing and sometimes directly contradictory testimony. 
For example, in addition to the statements set forth above, 
Hoskins testified that he did not know that officers were yelling 
at him (Tr. p.15), or that officers were behind him (Tr. p.16). 
Hoskins also testified that the only unusual thing he remembered 
seeing or hearing as he walked toward his house was his girlfriend 
yelling. (Tr. p.15). 
This version of the facts is contradicted by other portions of 
Hoskins' testimony. He first testified that his girlfriend's 
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yelling was the only unusual circumstance that he noticed (Tr. 
p.16), then he later admitted on cross-examination that "I heard 
the officers yelling, yes, sir, and the people over at the park 
yelling, yes, sir." (Tr. p.17). Also, Hoskms specifically 
testified that he did not know anyone was behind him as he moved 
toward his house. (Tr. p.16). However, he had previously testified 
that he was aware of the position of the police car and his own 
position relative to his front door at the time the officers were 
yelling. (Tr. p.14-15). The obvious question is how did he know he 
was approximately 15 feet from his front door at the time the 
officers were yelling "stop" if he was unaware that anyone was 
behind him or of any unusual circumstances other than his 
girlfriend's yelling? 
Another flaw in Hoskms' testimony is his claim that up until 
such time as he reappeared m his yard and was arrested, he did not 
know what was going on or "what all the fuss was about." (Tr. 
p. 17) . That contradicts his testimony that he heard both the people 
in the park and the officers yelling (Tr. p.17) and that he knew 
the police were present based on his observation of the police car 
(Tr. p.15) . His insistence that he didn't know what was going on or 
that anything unusual was going on is simply unbelievable. It is 
also contradicted by the testimony of his girlfriend Jodi Mattmson 
who observed the events from the driveway of the Hoskms' 
residence. (Tr. p.25). Ms. Mattmson testified that there had been 
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a problem across the street at the park where approximately 60 
people were playing basketball and that she believed the police 
should have been handling the problem at the park. (Tr. pp.25-27). 
Her testimony, when combined with the officer's testimony that he 
observed Hoskins talking with a group of people on the roadside 
next to the park, and the Officer's testimony that Mattinson was 
yelling at the police officers wanting to know why they were 
bothering her boyfriend (Hoskins) (Tr. p.8) obviously means that 
Mr. Hoskins was involved in whatever situation was going on at the 
park that had precipitated the police call. Also, Officer Casias 
specifically testified that there was no question that Hoskins saw 
the officers and knew that the officers were telling him to stop. 
(Tr. pp. 11-13) . For him to claim to be oblivious to what was going 
on is not credible. 
The testimony provided to the court by Hoskins was confusing 
and often contradictory. The trial court, while actually observing 
Hoskins' testimony, is in the best position to determine what 
portions of his testimony are believable and what portions are not 
and should be given great deference in making those determinations. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). For the trial court 
to choose to believe certain portions of Hoskins' testimony, 
particularly when supported by testimony of the police officer, is 
not clear error on the part of the trial court. The trial court 
had sufficient evidence to conclude that Hoskins was aware that the 
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officers were yelling at him to stop, yet he failed to do so. The 
trial court's evidentiary findings should be left undisturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Hoskins' 
conviction for "Fleeing a Peace Officer" is supported by 
substantial evidence. Further, his conduct fits squarely within the 
conduct which is proscribed by the ordinance. Finally, the trial 
court's determination of facts m this case are based upon solid 
evidence combined with the trial court's ability to determine the 
credibility of witnesses. The verdict of the trial court should 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this If day of__ , 2001. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J.VBachard Catten, Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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